1. Consider the following ballots for an election with four candidates $A$, $B$, $C$, and $D$. Sequential pairwise voting will be used to determine the winner.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
D & B & C \\
C & D & A \\
A & C & B \\
B & A & D \\
\end{array}
\]

You are not one of the voters, but you are the person who gets to decide the agenda. You prefer candidate $A$. Choose an agenda that makes $A$ the winner. Verify that your agenda works.

2. (Continuation of problem 1) Just before the election, you change your mind; now you prefer candidate $B$. Choose a different agenda that makes $B$ the winner. Verify that your agenda works.

3. (Continuation of problem 2) In a spurt of indecision, you again change your mind, and now you want $C$ to win. Choose an agenda that makes $C$ the winner. Verify that your agenda works.
4. (Continuation of problem 3) One last time, you change your mind, and now you want $D$ to win. Choose an agenda that makes $D$ the winner. Verify that your agenda works.

5. Plurality voting is not manipulable by individuals, but it is manipulable by **groups**. Use the Florida 2000 presidential election to illustrate how a group of voters can manipulate plurality voting.